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I. Introduction
UTURE deep space exploration missions will require an Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) to supply oxygen 
for crew metabolic consumption. A deep space mission is envisioned to have a crew of 4 on a 1,100 day mission. 
The system design will be based on the International Space Station (ISS) OGA but with added improvements based 
on lessons learned during ISS operations. These improvements will reduce system weight, crew maintenance time and 
resupply mass from Earth while increasing reliability. Currently, the design team is investigating the feasibility of the 
upgrades by performing ground tests and analyses.  Significant work has been performed since the last reporting in 
2015 (Ref. 1).  In addition, significant future work is planned.  The current status of the redesign effort will be 
presented in this paper. 
II. ISS OGA Description and Current Status
As of April 29, 2018, the OGA has produced over 14,202 lbm of oxygen and 1,775 lbm of hydrogen.  The currently 
installed OGA cell stack has accumulated a total operating time of 12,711 hours.  See Figure 1 for a plot of oxygen 
produced over time. 
A simplified schematic of the OGA is shown in Figure 2.  Feed water from the ISS potable water bus enters the 
assembly through the Water Assembly Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) and flows through an Inlet Deionizing Bed, 
which serves as an iodine remover and as a coalescer for any gas bubbles that may be present in the feedwater.  If gas 
bubbles are detected by the gas sensor downstream of the DI bed, the feedwater is rejected by a three-way valve to 
the waste water bus. This serves to prevent any oxygen that may be present in the feedwater from mixing with the 
generated hydrogen. Water is electrolyzed into oxygen and hydrogen in the Hydrogen Dome ORU, which contains 
the electrolysis cell stack, sensors, valves and a Rotary Separator Accumulator (RSA).  The RSA separates the cathode 
side product gaseous hydrogen 
from the water which is 
recirculated by the positive 
displacement Pump ORU.  The 
hydrogen dome provides a 
multiple leakage barrier 
protection in the event of a 
failure.  The hydrogen dome is 
maintained at low pressure by 
venting to space vacuum.  
Separated hydrogen gas is sent 
either to the Sabatier Carbon 
Dioxide Reduction Assembly or 
optionally out to space through 
the vacuum vent.  Oxygen 
produced by the cell stack passes 
through the Oxygen Outlet ORU 
containing a water absorber, 
which protects the downstream 
hydrogen sensors from liquid 
water.  The Hydrogen Sensor 
ORU monitors the product 
oxygen for the presence of hydrogen, which would indicate leakage within the cell stack and signal the OGA Process 
Controller to quickly shut down the OGA. The Nitrogen Purge ORU stores a pressurized volume of nitrogen gas from 
the ISS distribution line to purge the OGA cell stack upon shutdown.  Nitrogen is utilized to mitigate the safety hazards 
associated with the mixing of oxygen and hydrogen within the cell stack or the dome. The nitrogen can also be used 
to inert the dome environment during extended periods of non-operation.  The Process Controller ORU is responsible 
for OGA system command/control and communication with the ISS.  The OGA sensors are used for fault detection 
and fault isolation purposes. In addition, sensor data can be used to indicate that an ORU should be scheduled for 
change-out with a pre-positioned, on-orbit spare ORU.  The Power Supply Module (PSM) ORU provides power to 
F 
Figure 1. Total Oxygen Produced by the ISS OGA 
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the OGA electrolysis cell stack.  The PSM ORU provides a variable range of 10-46.9 amps of current to the OGA cell 
stack during Process mode and 1.0 amps during Standby mode (2% oxygen production rate). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. OGA Simplified Schematic. 
 
The OGA is designed to generate oxygen at a nominal rate of 5.4 kg/day (12 lbm/day) when operated on day/night 
orbital cycles (53 minutes at 100% production, 37 minutes in standby which produces 0.44 lbm/day of oxygen), and 
also at a selectable rate between 2.3 and 9.2 kg/day (5.1 and 20.4 lbm/day) or 22 to 100% oxygen production rate 
when operated continuously. At the nominal rate, the OGA can support oxygen needs for 4 crew, while at the 
maximum rate it can support 10 crew.  The product oxygen meets quality specifications for temperature, free water, 
dew point, and hydrogen content.  The OGA is packaged into eight ORUs, residing in the OGS rack, as shown in 
Figure 3.  Most of the OGA ORUs are run to failure except for the calibration life limited Hydrogen Sensor ORU and 
the mixed-resin containing ORUs (Inlet DI Bed and recirculation loop ACTEX) which are trended for water 
throughput and return water quality to determine the Preventative Maintenance (PM) replacement intervals. 
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Figure 3. OGS Rack 
 
III. Proposed Upgrades and Current Status 
Several lessons learned, based on over a decade of ISS OGA operations, have been previously documented (Ref. 
1).  Recent major ISS OGA events are timelined in Figure 4.  Other than OGA component preventative maintenance 
replacements, periodic dome sensor vacuum zero point offsets, drifting hydrogen sensor inhibits and recirculation 
loop sample returns, three failures associated with the Hydrogen (H2) ORU were investigated. 
Since May 2014 the OGA team has been monitoring anomalous voltage trends in the installed SN 2 H2 ORU cell 
stack assembly’s Cell #1 since first detected (fastest discharge rate upon deactivation, slowest charge rate to Standby 
and lowest voltage in standby or process compared to the other 27 cells). During an October 2016 reactivation to 
Standby attempt, OGA went to Fast Shutdown. Data dump indicated low voltage across Cell #1.  Cell #1 voltage was 
progressively dropping lower than the electrolysis threshold voltage of 1.48 VDC towards the FDIR low voltage 
shutdown limit of 1.0 VDC during transitions from Process to Standby (nominal Standby voltage is 1.51 VDC). The 
failed ORU was replaced in early November 2016 with Hydrogen ORU s/n 3 and returned for Test, Teardown and 
Evaluation (TT&E) and failure investigation.  Total cumulative on-orbit electrolysis time while SN 2 H2 ORU was 
installed was 5.28 years.  The H2 ORU predicted design life is 5 years.  Cells # 1 and #2 were removed from the cell 
stack and both non-destructive and destructive tests were performed.  Significant narrowing was observed within Cell 
#1 cross-sectional thickness in the contact areas of the adjacent cathode and anode screen pack wires as compared to 
Cell #2.  In addition, there was a metallic appearing, small contaminant compressed into 50% of the cell membrane 
under the cathode screen wire. Both findings could have contributed to the voltage shunting exhibited by Cell # 1 on-
orbit. Failure investigation on Cells # 1 and #2 is nearly complete and a final report expected by June 2018. 
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The SN 4 H2 ORU 
ground spare failed during 
its every 180 day 
electrolysis preventative 
maintenance.  The failure 
was determined to be 
caused by an internal ORU 
cell voltage sensing 
harness which had 
reflowed solder joints 
between resistor leads 
pairs.  H2 ORU voltage 
sensing harness resistor 
wire solder joint defects 
were systemic and likely 
latent failures due to poor 
harness materials selection 
(higher shrink tube vs. 
solder eutectic temps), 
design and manufacturing 
processes.  All of the spare 
(on-orbit and ground) H2 
ORU harnesses have either a repaired or redesigned voltage sensing harness that mitigated the risk of reflowed solder 
joints.  If the OGA installed SN 3 H2 ORU with the old suspect harness design (reflowed solder risk) fails due to bad 
harness solder joint(s) then the ISS program has approved continued operations of OGA at less than 45% O2 
production rate and to allow inhibits on up to 6 voltage sensing lines per a NASA Safety Assessment Chit. 
The crew was not able to fully mate the OGA SN 3 H2 ORU ¾ inch quick disconnect (QD) to the DIW from RSA 
flex hose QD after replacing SN 2 H2 ORU in November 2016. The same partially mated QD issue was experienced 
earlier in November 2016 due to an inability to fully mate a CRFH Water Adapter ¾”  universal QD to the same OGS 
rack flex hose QD during setup for an OGA recirculation loop flush.  Crew reported that the QD was at 90% connected 
or ¼ turn from fully mated in both cases.  The mated QD pair was Kapton taped to minimize risk of QDs backing off 
given only one of the two redundant seals against external leakage is engaged (primary seal).  Failure investigation 
continues with additional QD fit checks on the returned, suspect CRFH adapter and a new spare hose (QD procurement 
and hose build in-work) expected to be completed in early 2019. 
Two studies were completed since the last reporting in 2015 (Ref. 1).  A redesign study was completed in 2016 by 
UTC Aerospace Systems (UTAS).  This study examined the existing ISS OGA design, identified areas of 
improvement, proposed a new configuration and documented the safety analysis of the redesigned system to support 
a crew of 4 on an 1,100 day mission.  In 2017, a supportability analysis of this system was performed by the Space 
Mission Analysis Branch at Langley Research Center.  This study examined the spare parts requirements for a 1,100-
day deep space mission, assuming that spares are provided to achieve 0.995 probability of sufficiency (POS), where 
POS is defined as the probability that the set of spares provided are sufficient to repair failures during the mission. For 
the purposes of this study, ORU failure rates were assumed to be deterministically known, with no epistemic 
uncertainty; as a result, it is likely that the spares estimates presented here are lower than the values that would be 
calculated if epistemic uncertainty were accounted for. A more detailed discussion of the supportability analysis 
techniques used and the impact of epistemic uncertainty is presented in References 5 and 6.  The OGA supportability 
study concluded that the OGA would be the third most logistically intensive system (out of 17) on a deep space 
exploration vehicle. In addition, the supportability study examined the impact of various proposed design changes on 
spares mass; for example, it found that lower level maintenance at the component level (rather than at the ORU level) 
has the potential to enable significant spares mass reduction, and provided the estimates of spares mass reduction 
impacts described in the sections below. 
Based on the lessons learned during ISS operations and the study recommendations, several upgrades to the OGA 
design have been proposed.  Table 1 lists each of the proposed upgrades. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Timeline of Recent OGA Events 
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Table 1. Proposed Upgrades 
Proposed Upgrade Reason Description 
Cell stack membrane replacement SOA membrane is obsolete Replace obsolete Nafion membrane 
with chemically stabilized Nafion 
membrane 
Delete the nitrogen purge equipment Reduce system mass and complexity Delete nitrogen purging of the cell 
stack anode during shutdowns and 
startups 
Replace hydrogen sensors Reduce crew maintenance time and 
improve reliability 
Replace hydrogen sensors with a 
more reliable technology that 
requires less crew intervention 
Delete the wastewater interface Reduce system mass and complexity Allow oxygen gas that may be in the 
feedwater into the RSA rather than 
being rejected to the wastewater bus 
Remove the hydrogen dome Reduce logistics resupply 
requirements 
Crew will be able to access and 
maintain the internal dome 
components 
Redesign the PSM Reduce system mass/volume SOA PSM is oversized for a future 
mission and contains obsolete parts 
Redesign the recirculation loop 
ACTEX deionizing bed 
Increase installed life and reduce the 
delta pressure 
The existing design is not optimal as 
it was not specifically designed for 
the OGA 
Redesign the process controller Two newly design sensor boards to 
be installeded into the controller for 
additional sensor and effectors  
New connectors and backplane 
harnesses and swap-out of two 
sensor circuit card boards 
   
A. Cell Stack Membrane Replacement 
The ISS OGA cell stack is a cathode feed design, with 28 cells to electrolyze water to generate oxygen and 
hydrogen.  Each cell contains a cathode compartment and an anode compartment, separated by a Nafion membrane 
(originally manufactured by DuPont).  Thin layers of catalyst are applied on each side of the membrane to form the 
anode and cathode electrodes of the cell.  
In this design, feed water is circulated on 
the cathode side of the cells, where 
hydrogen is generated.  Excess water 
carries away the produced hydrogen and 
process heat.  The membrane’s high water 
permeability allows sufficient water 
transport to the anode, where the 
electrolysis actually takes place.  Oxygen 
is generated at the anode, where it is 
virtually free of liquid water. 
The original Nafion membrane 
material used in the ISS OGA cell stack is 
obsolete.  Chemours now offers 
“chemically stabilized” Nafion, which has 
a much lower fluoride release rate. This 
chemically stabilized Nafion has not been 
incorporated into the ISS OGA cell stack 
or any spares.  Another consideration is 
that the ISS OGA cell stack vendor, 
UTAS, no longer manufactures cell stacks 
for this application. 
 
Figure 5. Giner Cell Stack Acceptance Testing 
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The buildup of hydrofluoric acid within the recirculation loop was the cause of the ISS OGA cell stack failure in 
2010.  Incorporating chemically stabilized Nafion, with its lower fluoride release rate, should improve system 
reliability. 
As previously reported (Ref. 1), NASA contracted with Giner, Inc. to build three single cells. These single cells 
were of the same design as the ISS OGA cells (same physical dimensions, active area, and current density), except 
that the newer chemically stabilized Nafion was used for the membranes.  Based on the acceptable results of the single 
cell endurance testing and post test health checks, Giner was funded to build a 28-cell stack in 2015.  The 28-cell stack 
incorporates the chemically stabilized Nafion and the cells are the same design as the ISS OGA.  After assembly of 
the cell stack, Giner performed two weeks of acceptance testing, as shown in Figure 5.  The cell stack exhibited stable 
voltage performance during this test.  Oxygen and hydrogen production rates were within 1.7% of the calculated 
theoretical values.  The cell stack passed all leak tests, resistance tests and oxygen and hydrogen purity checks.  Based 
on these successful results, the cell stack was accepted by NASA and installed into the OGA Test Bed at MSFC in 
2016, as shown in Figure 6.  To date, the cell stack has accumulated 300 
hours of nominal operation.  The stack will continue to be operated for the 
foreseeable future.  Periodic polarization scans are performed to monitor for 
changes in performance in any of the cells. 
In parallel with the 28 cell testing, a single cell with chemically stable 
Nafion (built in 2014) is undergoing ongoing endurance testing at UTAS.  
The single cell has accumulated over 14,000 hours to date with no voltage 
degradation and will be continuously operated for the foreseeable future. 
 
B. Delete the Nitrogen Purge Equipment 
The ISS OGA requires an external source of nitrogen, provided by the 
ISS vehicle.  The ISS OGA has approximately 50 lb of equipment to handle 
the storage and distribution of nitrogen.  Nitrogen is used for two purposes.  
The first is to purge the cell stack anode upon system shutdown and startup.  
During prolonged shutdowns, hydrogen in the cathode compartment will 
migrate through the membrane to the anode compartment, which contains 
oxygen.  At shutdown, a nitrogen purge will replace the oxygen with 
nitrogen, preventing a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen in the anode from forming over time when the system is 
unpowered.  At startup, a nitrogen purge removes any hydrogen that may have permeated through the membrane to 
the anode. 
The second purpose is to fill the hydrogen dome prior to removal from the system with nitrogen to create an inert 
condition for transportation.  If the hydrogen dome is deleted, as discussed elsewhere in this paper, the need for inerting 
the dome will be obviated. 
The benefit of deleting the nitrogen purging equipment is a reduction in system complexity and weight.  In 
addition, the vehicle design will be simplified since it will not be required to supply nitrogen to OGA.  The 
supportability analysis determined that nitrogen purge equipment accounted for 204 lb (93 kg) of spares upmass on a 
1,100-day mission, given a POS requirement of 0.995. Removal of the nitrogen purge equipment could lower total 
spares mass by this amount as well as reduce the OGA system mass. 
In previous reporting (Ref. 1), it was proposed that the nitrogen purging equipment could be safely deleted. During 
the single cell testing (described in the previous section) at Giner, one of the cells was operated safely without any 
nitrogen purging for ten months.  No safety issues or change in functional performance occurred.  At UTAS, flight 
ISS OGA cell stacks are operated safely without nitrogen purging during ground testing.   
The OGA Test Bed was modified in Feb 2014 to operate without nitrogen purging of the anode during shutdown 
and startup.  The OGA Test Bed has operated for 135 hours safely without any nitrogen purging. 
A trade study was performed in 2016 on whether to delete the nitrogen purge function.  Without nitrogen purging 
a significant amount of water would form in the cell stack anode compartments during each shutdown.  A new absorber 
would need to be incorporated to remove the water from the product oxygen, since the downstream hydrogen sensors 
would be damaged if exposed to liquid water.  In addition, during each shutdown, the water recirculation loop would 
be driven to subambient pressures without nitrogen purging.  Nitrogen purging pressurizes the anode and also helps 
maintain the proper pressure in the cathode and recirculation loop during unpowered periods, which facilitates the 
subsequent startup.  Deleting the nitrogen purging would add new design risks and operational complexity.  Based on 
 
Figure 6. Giner 28 Cell Stack 
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the results of the trade study, the design team decided to keep the nitrogen purge function in the future advanced OGA 
design. 
C. Replace Hydrogen Sensors 
The ISS OGA contains three independent hydrogen sensors to monitor for hydrogen in the product oxygen prior 
to being released into the ISS cabin atmosphere.  The process controller shuts down the OGA if any of the sensors 
detect more than one percent hydrogen in oxygen (25% of the lower flammability limit, [LFL]).  The presence of 
hydrogen in the product oxygen indicates a cross cell leak within the cell stack.  The hydrogen sensors are sensitive 
to moisture.  Condensation on the hydrogen sensor dies while being powered will cause permanent damage.  To 
prevent condensation, heaters maintain the temperature above the dew point of the oxygen coming from the cell stack.  
After every system shutdown, the crew must connect the hydrogen sensors to a dry oxygen source to remove 
condensation.  The hydrogen sensors must be returned to earth every 201 days for recalibration. 
In late December 2016, the ISS OGA went to fast shutdown due to one of the three redundant hydrogen sensors 
outputs going off-scale high within 0.1 second.  The other two sensors remained nominal.  Per the flight rule allowing 
one of three sensors to be inhibited, the failed sensor was inhibited during its remaining installed life. This failed 
hydrogen sensor is scheduled to be returned in July 2018 for failure investigation. 
In 2017, a hydrogen sensor replacement study was initiated.  A market survey was conducted to identify potential 
replacement candidates.  The requirements for a replacement sensor are defined in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Hydrogen Sensor Requirements 
Requirement Comments 
Capable of measuring hydrogen in oxygen All commercially available hydrogen sensors are 
marketed as hydrogen in air sensors 
No offset due to high relative humidity oxygen The current ISS OGA hydrogen sensors are susceptible 
to damage if powered after being exposed to high 
humidity gas. 
No offset due to nitrogen exposure The current ISS OGA hydrogen sensors exhibit 
significant (temporary) offset after exposure to nitrogen.  
Nitrogen purging occurs after every system shutdown 
and start up. 
No downward drift in calibration over time Downward drift is in the non-conservative direction and 
if significant enough is a hazard since the sensor will 
report less hydrogen than actual.  Downward drift limits 
the calibration life. 
Fast response time Fast response time is required to detect a hazard 
(hydrogen leaking into the product oxygen) and shut 
down the system.  The current ISS OGA hydrogen 
sensors are required to have a 6 second response time 
(time to indicate 1% when exposed to 4% H2 in O2). 
Long calibration life The current ISS OGA hydrogen sensors are limited to a 
calibration life of 201 days, after which they must be 
returned to the ground for recalibration.  This limited 
lifetime is also a driver of demand for crew time to 
replace the hydrogen sensors. 
 
In 2017, a market survey of hydrogen sensors was performed.  The H2Sense database of over 400 sensor models 
was reviewed.  The technology type, packaging, range and design maturity were considered. Six potential candidates 
were identified which met the requirements.  These candidates are currently undergoing testing, which will conclude 
in 2018.  Testing is broken into three major sections: initial bench testing, endurance testing in the OGA Test Bed, 
and final bench testing.   
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The bench test rig is designed to supply humidified gas mixtures of oxygen, hydrogen and nitrogen to the hydrogen 
sensor under test.  K-bottles of hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen provide source gas.  The oxygen and hydrogen are 
metered using mass flow controllers 
to provide precise mixtures from 0 to 
3% hydrogen in oxygen.  The gas 
mixtures are humidified, close to 
100% relative humidity, to simulate 
the product oxygen from the cell 
stack.  Periodic nitrogen purging is 
also performed during bench testing 
to simulate on-orbit shutdown and 
startup nitrogen purging.  Sensor 
response is compared to the expected 
response.  For example, when 
exposed to 1% hydrogen in oxygen, 
the actual response is recorded to 
determine the amount a particular 
sensor is under-reporting or over-
reporting.  An example response is 
shown in Figure 7.  Two percent 
hydrogen in oxygen gas (as 
determined by the hydrogen and 
oxygen mass flow controllers) is 
flowed through two candidate sensors.  Both sensors over-report the amount of hydrogen, by 6.3% and 15.2%. Over-
reporting is considered conservative and not a safety risk (although could lead to nuisance shutdowns depending on 
the amount of offset).  Over-reporting is not necessarily considered a disqualifying characteristic.  During bench 
testing, five sensors were eliminated (see Table 3). 
Once the initial bench testing was completed, the two remaining candidate sensors were installed into the OGA 
Test Bed for approximately 1000 hours of endurance testing.  This exposes the sensors to flight-like conditions: 
product oxygen from a cell stack at the expected humidity, temperature and flow rate. 
After the endurance testing is completed later in 2018, the sensors will be reinstalled into the bench test rig.  The 
bench tests will be repeated to determine what changes in performance as a result of being installed in the OGA Test 
Bed occurred, and if a drift rate can be determined. 
The candidates, along with the current testing status as of March 20, 2018 are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Hydrogen Sensor Candidates 
Sensor Technology Current Status 
Sensor #1 Catalytic bead Endurance testing in the OGA Test 
Bed 
Sensor #2 Metal oxide semiconductor Eliminated – randomly goes in and 
out of alarm state during initial 
bench testing 
Sensor #3 Metal oxide semiconductor Eliminated – failed during initial 
bench testing 
Sensor #4 Thermal conductivity Eliminated – unstable during initial 
bench testing 
Sensor #5 Catalytic reactor Eliminated – failed to respond 
during initial bench testing after 
subjected to humid oxygen 
Sensor #6 Thermal conductivity Endurance testing in the OGA Test 
Bed 
Sensor #7 Resistive Eliminated – unstable when exposed 
to nitrogen during initial bench 
testing 
 
Figure 7.  Hydrogen Sensor Response 
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D. Delete the Waste Water Interface 
Feed water is batch supplied to the ISS OGA to replace water consumed by electrolysis.  Feed water flows through 
an inlet deionizing bed to remove iodine.  Oxygen in the feedwater can coalesce in the inlet deionizing bed and oxygen 
bubbles will be released periodically out of the bed.  Two gas sensors will detect this release and a three-way valve 
will divert the feed water to the wastewater bus and prevent oxygen gas bubbles from entering the RSA where it could 
mix with hydrogen gas.  Once the feed water is clear of oxygen bubbles, the three-way valve is repositioned to allow 
water flow into the RSA. 
After eleven years of operation, gas bubbles in the feed water have been detected occasionally.  There are eight 
known events (8/21/09, 11/14/09, 4/14/10, 12/19/13, 7/30/14, 8/12/14, 9/4/15, 10/15/15) where the feed water was 
diverted to the wastewater bus due to gas detected in the feed water.  On 12/19/13, oxygen gas was detected in the 
feed water and allowed to go into the RSA (because the gas was detected downstream of the 3-way valve, it was not 
possible to send this oxygen bubble to the wastewater bus).  After this event, the OGA continued to operate nominally.  
There are no known events since 2015. 
The 2017 supportability analysis study determined that 216 lb (91 kg) of logistics upmass could be saved for a 
1,100-day mission with a POS requirement of 0.995 by deleting the waste water interface from the design.  The waste 
water interface is part of the Water ORU, as shown in Figure 2.  While the waste water components account for only 
22% of the mass of the Water ORU, they contribute 66% of the failure rate of that ORU.  As a result, removing the 
waste water components from the Water ORU nearly triples the MTBF of that ORU, lowering the probability of 
failure and reducing the number of spares that would need to be carried.  This provides incentive for deleting the waste 
water interface.  However, the burden for providing gas free water would be placed on the Water Processor Assembly 
(WPA).  This could potentially increase WPA system complexity and logistics upmass.  A trade study will need to be 
performed to determine whether the waste water interface should be deleted from the OGA. 
E. Remove the Hydrogen Dome 
The ISS OGA hydrogen dome encloses all hydrogen containing components: cell stack, RSA, solenoid valves, 
relief valves, pressure sensors, temperature sensors, and connecting tubing.  The dome is connected to space vacuum 
and is maintained at a vacuum.  The purpose of the dome is to detect hydrogen leakage out of the cell stack or RSA 
(via a pressure rise in the dome), contain hydrogen leakage and contain any accelerated debris from a possible 
detonation event after multiple failures. 
There are commercial and military cell stacks that have operated safely for thousands of hours without a dome.  
During ground testing, the ISS OGA cell stacks are regularly operated safely without a dome.  The dome was 
incorporated into the ISS OGA design out of an abundance of safety conservatism.  The disadvantage of the dome is 
that the internal components are inaccessible to the crew for maintenance.  If one of the components fails (such as a 
valve), the entire dome assembly (288 lb launch weight) will need to be replaced. In over eleven years of operation 
on ISS and on the ground, no external hydrogen leakage out of the cell stack or RSA has occurred. 
The 2017 supportability study determined that deleting the dome and allowing component level maintenance of 
the internal components, would result in an estimated 617 lb (280 kg) of spares mass savings for a 1,100 day 
exploration mission, given a required POS of 0.995.  However, going to a lower level of repair has other impacts on 
the system that must be considered. From a supportability perspective, lower level repair tends to increase the amount 
of crew time required for maintenance activities. Since crew time is a valuable and limited resource on space missions, 
the potential value of this change in terms of spares mass reduction should be weighed against its potential impacts in 
terms of crew time available for utilization. In addition, removing the dome from the OGA is not a trivial task.  With 
a no-dome design, a specific failure scenario is of concern.  After multiple failures, a release of hydrogen into the rack 
or cabin could potentially occur.  The leak could be a small undetectable continuous leak or a large sudden release.  
Small undetectable leaks will likely not pose a hazard as they will remain below the flammability limit with proper 
ventilation and eventually will be removed by the Trace Contaminant Control System. Large sudden releases of 
hydrogen are considered to be a hazard.  If this were immediately ignited, a nearby crew member could potentially be 
harmed.  In order to quantify the risk, testing and analysis will need to be performed.  Table 4 documents the additional 
testing and analysis which will need to occur. 
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Table 4. Hydrogen Dome Removal Tasks 
Task Description Status 
Remove the dome from the OGA 
Test Bed 
Demonstrate safe operation without 
a dome 
Dome removal is complete.  Testing 
is ongoing. 
Perform hydrogen release analysis Determine the maximum amount of 
hydrogen that could instantaneously 
be released externally by the 
undomed components in the event of 
multiple failures 
Initial analysis is complete.  
However, the analysis will need to 
be updated as the redesign 
progresses. 
Perform flash fire testing and 
analysis 
Determine effect on a nearby crew 
member of a hydrogen release (due 
to multiple failures) and combustion 
Complete 
Perform cell stack burst test Test to demonstrate that an undomed 
cell stack will not leak at MDP 
Buildup is underway, testing will 
occur later in 2018 
Redesign internal components to 
have redundant seals 
Most internal components currently 
have a single seal preventing 
hydrogen from leaking externally.  
Redesign will be required for certain 
parts to incorporate redundant seals 
to meet safety requirements 
Not started 
Perform Maximum Design Pressure 
(MDP) analysis of undomed 
components 
Determine the MDP of undomed 
components (cell stack and RSA) 
Analysis is ongoing and will 
complete in 2018 
Add hydrogen and oxygen flow 
sensors to the design 
Supplement existing leak detection 
methods 
Demonstrated feasibility of flow 
sensors on the OGA Test Bed 
Rack ventilation computational 
fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis 
Verify that rack ventilation will 
dilute a hydrogen leak below the 
LFL 
Not started 
 
The vacuum dome was removed from the OGA Test Bed in 2015, and since then has operated safely for over 325 
hours.  No external hydrogen leakage has been detected by facility hydrogen sensors.  The cell stack, RSA, and all 
other hydrogen containing components are exposed to the ambient air.  The OGA Test Bed will continue to be operated 
in this configuration for the foreseeable future. 
A hydrogen release analysis was performed in 2018 to 
determine the worst case amount of hydrogen that could be 
instantaneously released from an undomed OGA in the event 
of multiple failures.  The cell stack, RSA and interconnecting 
plumbing contain pressurized hydrogen.  Assuming a 22 cell 
stack and a standard sized RSA, the worst case release of 
hydrogen after multiple failures would be approximately 81 
cu-in.  This is a preliminary estimate and will likely increase 
as the redesign progresses. 
Bangham Engineering was contracted to perform flash 
fire testing and CFD modeling in 2017.  The purpose of this 
effort was to determine the effect on a nearby crew member 
of a sudden hydrogen release due to a failure and subsequent 
combustion (possibly due to an electrostatic discharge).  
Acoustic noise, overpressure, ultraviolet (UV) and infrared 
(IR) radiation exposure due to a hydrogen combustion could 
adversely affect a nearby crew member.  A test stand was 
configured to inject specific quantities of hydrogen (100 – 250 cu-in) downwards into the open air.  See Figure 8.  
Immediately after the injection (within a 5 ms), it is ignited before the hydrogen can rise and escape the test stand.  
Hydrogen released in air rises at a rate of 10 ft/s.  Calibrated pressure sensors, UV and IR spectrometers, microphones, 
and a high speed camera captured each combustion event. 
 
Figure 8. Hydrogen Flash Fire Test Rig 
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The test data was compared to established limits, summarized in Table 5.  A person standing right next to a 100 
cu-in hydrogen cloud that was injected into the air and immediately ignited in 1-g would not be harmed, i.e. would 
not suffer hearing damage, physical damage, eye damage or skin burning.  The measured response was 132 dB acoustic 
level, 0.07 psi overpressure, 0.0002 J/cm2 UV exposure level, 0.01 cal/cm2 total energy. 
 
Table 5.  Limits of Exposure 
 Limit Source Exceeded during 1-g 
testing, for 100 cu-in 
release? 
Acoustic 140 dB OSHA impulse 
noise limit 
No 
Overpressure 2 psi WSTF No 
UV 0.003 J/cm2 ACGIH No 
Total energy 
exposure 
2 cal/cm2 Industry No 
 
Only a fraction of the injected hydrogen in the test stand actually combusted.  CFD modeling predicted for the 1-
g test case that only about 50% of the total hydrogen at the moment of ignition would be available to participate in a 
combustion event, due to inefficient mixing.  In other words, there would be areas of the injected hydrogen that would 
be too hydrogen rich to combust and there would be other areas that would be too hydrogen lean to combust.  Of the 
50% hydrogen available for combustion, testing revealed that only about 30% of that actually combusted in the 1-g 
environment.  This is due primarily to two causes.  First, drag acting upon the released gas causes some of the hydrogen 
to be stripped away and not participate in the combustion.  This effect was confirmed with the CFD modeling.  Second, 
the combustion pressure wave, which is ahead of the flame front, will push away a certain amount of hydrogen.  This 
hydrogen that is pushed away will not participate in the combustion.  This effect was confirmed by the high speed 
video of the combustion tests. 
However, it is expected that in 0-g, more than 50% of the hydrogen leaked from an OGA system would be available 
to participate in a combustion.  Hydrogen leaked from an OGA system in 0-g would stay relatively stationary and 
after time would diffuse and mix with the air better than what was observed in the 1-g test stand.  Based on CFD 
modeling it is predicted that, worst case, 80% of the released hydrogen would be available for combustion.  However, 
the drag and pressure wave phenomenon observed in 1-g would still be present in 0-g.  Taking these factors into 
account, it is predicted that 60% (or less) of any released hydrogen in 0-g would combust. Since yields in 0-g are 
predicted to be higher than in 1-g, adjustments to the terrestrial test results are required.  Taking this into account, a 
worst case hydrogen release of 81 cu-in and immediate ignition on ISS would result in an acoustic event greater than 
the 140 dB limit and therefore is considered a critical hazard.  There is no concern of exceeding the established limits 
for overpressure, UV or total energy exposure.  Future work will involve showing that proper controls will be in place 
(such as redundant seals and ventilation) to prevent the hazard after a worst case hydrogen leak. 
With the previous dome design, the assumption was made that the dome would contain any leakage or burst of the 
internal cell stack and RSA due to a combustion event.  Now that the dome 
will be removed from the design, the cell stack and RSA must be shown 
to contain any internal combustion.  If they cannot, a redesign will be 
required. 
A cell stack burst test demonstration program is currently underway.  
A non-operational cell stack pressure test article is currently being built.  
Most components have already been manufactured.  The end plates are 
the major items still being machined.  The frames and end plates are the 
same design as the ISS cell stack.  Internal components, which do not 
affect external sealing, such as the cathode and anode screens are made 
with lower cost materials.  Once the cell stack is assembled, it will be 
subjected to a pressurization test in mid-2018.  The cell stack will be slowly pressurized until external leakage or burst 
occurs.  The pressure at which a failure occurs will be compared to the pressure associated with a worst case internal 
combustion event.  This will provide guidance on whether a redesign of the cell stack is required. 
 
Figure 9. Hydrogen Flow Sensor 
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Existing sensors can provide an 
indication of external hydrogen leakage 
from the cell stack or RSA.  Pressure 
sensors monitor the recirculation loop 
pressure and quantity sensors monitor the 
quantity of water in the RSA.  An external 
leak can cause a drop in the recirculation 
loop pressure and RSA water quantity if 
the leak is large enough.  To provide finer 
leak detection, new sensors are required.  
Flow sensors in the hydrogen vent line and 
the oxygen outlet line are proposed.   An 
external leak of hydrogen will cause a 
decrease in flow of hydrogen out of the 
hydrogen vent line.  A cross cell leak, 
allowing hydrogen to flow out of the 
oxygen outlet line, will cause an increase 
in total flow out of the oxygen outlet line.  
Gas flow can be sensed in various ways.  
One method of detecting flow is to sense 
delta pressure across an orifice installed in the line.  A valve (acting as an orifice) and a delta pressure sensor were 
installed in both the hydrogen vent line and oxygen outlet line of the OGA Test Bed.  The modified hydrogen vent 
line is shown in Figure 9.  Reliably sensing flow at different production rates was demonstrated.  Hydrogen flow, as 
sensed by the delta pressure sensor (in red), and cell stack current (in blue), is depicted in Figure 10.  The relationship 
between flow rate and cell stack current is illustrated.  Further analysis will be performed to determine how small of 
an external hydrogen leak can be detected with the flow sensors. 
The ISS OGA currently contains an Avionics Air Assembly (AAA) which provides ventilation within the rack.  
There is a software control in place that verifies ventilation is active while the OGA is producing oxygen.  CFD 
analysis has been performed to verify that the ventilation will prevent an elevated oxygen concentration in the rack, 
which would be a fire hazard.  Now that the OGA design will be modified to remove the hydrogen dome, there is a 
new concern of hydrogen buildup in the rack (after multiple failures).  Future CFD analysis will determine if additional 
ventilation, in addition to the AAA, is required. 
 
 
F. Redesign the PSM 
The ISS OGA PSM is a constant current power supply for the cell stack.  It is able to provide over 3800 Watts of 
power for electrolysis.  The PSM is a modular design, 
containing 4 power converter units along with filter 
boards, control board, relay, etc. The internal 
configuration is shown in Figure 11.  The PSM has a 
weight of 100 lb and dimensions of 24 x 15 x 11 inches. 
The PSM will need to be redesigned for several 
reasons.  The PSM design was performed approximately 
20 years ago.  A PSM redesign study was conducted in 
2016 which concluded that the design is based on 
discrete components and some of these are obsolete,  a 
reduction in mass and volume can be realized with a 
redesign and the PSM should be redesigned using a space 
rated microcontroller.  This one microcontroller could 
potentially take the place of dozens of discrete 
components.  At this time no funding is available to 
pursue a redesign, however, it is still recognized as a 
priority for the OGA redesign. 
 
 
Figure 11. PSM Configuration 
 
 
Figure 10.  Hydrogen Flow and Cell Stack Current 
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G. ACTEX Redesign 
A -311 ACTEX deionizing bed, with inlet and outlet hoses, was retrofitted into the ISS OGA recirculation loop in 
2011 to prevent recurrence of the cell stack failure in 2010 (Ref. 2).  The purpose of the ACTEX (Figure 12) is to 
remove fluoride that is released by the cell stack 
membranes and maintain a desirable pH level in the 
water recirculation loop.  The ACTEX was not 
specifically designed for the OGA, and should be 
redesigned to be optimized for a future exploration 
mission.  The current ACTEX has a 1.8 year installed 
life.  For a 3-year exploration mission, the ACTEX 
should be redesigned to increase its capacity.  
Another issue that should be addressed is that the 
ACTEX has a significant pressure drop of 
approximately 16 psid.   When the ACTEX is used in 
the OGA, there are several non-compliance waivers, 
since it does not meet MDP requirements, seal 
redundancy requirements and materials compatibility 
requirements.  Redesign options have been proposed 
which increase the canister volume, replace quick 
disconnects with fittings and incorporate redundant seals. 
 
H. Redesign the Process Controller 
Two newly design sensor boards will need to be installed into the process controller to accommodate the additional 
sensor and effectors in the new advanced OGA design. In addition, the backplane will need to be redesigned to get 
additional power and signals to the new boards. The thermal analysis will need to be updated to confirm that there is 
adequate cooling with the redesigned controller.  New internal controller harnessing will be required to get power and 
signals from the backplane to the circular connectors that feed through to the external OGA harnessing.  Rack electrical 
harnesses will have to be modified to mate to new electrical components. System software will be modified to control 
new effectors and monitor new sensors. 
 
IV. Future Plans 
The ultimate goal is to demonstrate an exploration based OGA on the ISS in the 2021 timeframe.  The existing 
ISS OGA will be modified to incorporate the proposed upgrades.  This will allow several years of operation in an on-
orbit environment and resolve any issues before an exploration mission.  New special studies will be conducted in 
2018 to further mature the system design and interfaces.  A Systems Requirements Review (SRR) is tentatively 
planned for December 2018.  The SRR will officially define the system requirements, after which the detailed design 
can begin.  A major change request (CR) is currently out for review and estimates to develop, design, and deliver 
modification kits to establish a demonstration advanced OGA are being developed.  In addition, the OGS rack is 
planned to be relocated from Node 3 to the US Laboratory Module. 
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